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OUT-TECHING PRODUCTS LIABILITY: REVIVING STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN AN AGE OF AMAZON
Ryan Bullard*
From humble beginnings as an internet start-up in the mid–
1990s, Amazon has transformed itself into the prodigious and
omnipresent e-commerce Leviathan of the early twenty-first century,
cashing in on a society and economy increasingly comfortable
with — and dependent on — technology-based services. In addition
to its recent forays into brick-and-mortar grocery stores, film and
television production, fast-fashion, cloud computing, consumer data
analytics, and delivery and logistics services, Amazon is most wellknown as the force behind a multi-billion dollar online marketplace
where its own products are listed for sale next to products listed by
third-party vendors.
Grievous injuries and property damage resulting from defective
third-party products sold through Amazon’s marketplace have been
the issue of a number of recent lawsuits alleging strict products
liability against Amazon itself. The courts that heard these cases
refused to extend strict liability to Amazon, but this recent
development argues that these decisions run afoul of the spirit of the
American strict products liability regime that emerged in the mid–
twentieth century. American courts recognized that the imposition
of strict liability on manufacturers, distributors, and retailers alike
for injuries caused by defective products that they placed into the
consumer marketplace had multiple desirable social purposes that
warranted shifting the loss from consumers to members of the
distribution chain.
After briefly surveying the history and intent behind the original
American strict products liability regime, this recent development
explores how Amazon “out-teched” products liability in four recent
cases and considers why the current standard of negligence is
insufficient to protect consumers in the modern economy. It
*
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concludes with an explanation of how and why courts should refocus
their jurisprudence on the original policy goals expressed in the
seminal products liability cases of the mid-twentieth century.
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I. INTRODUCTION
First-year law students across the United States learn in their
introductory torts classes that any entity in the manufacturing,
distribution, or retail chain of a defective product can be held liable
for injuries that result from that defective product.1 This theory of
strict liability for defective products, first articulated by California
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor in 1944, was widely adopted
in the United States throughout the mid-twentieth century.2 This
doctrine, as with tort law generally, showed a remarkable ability to
evolve over time, adapting to a changing economy in order to most
effectively protect consumers.3 Over the past twenty years, an
increasingly interconnected and modernizing global economy has
given rise to e-commerce behemoths like Amazon.com. This
incredible change in the consumer market calls for a corresponding
evolution in the law of products liability; however, courts have so
far failed to facilitate the legal progress necessary to protect
consumers.
In a recent ruling from the Southern District of New York,
Amazon was relieved of any test of strict liability for an allegedly
defective product that a consumer bought through the online
retailer’s “Fulfillment By Amazon” service.4 This is not the first
instance in which Amazon has escaped strict products liability under
similar circumstances, and a string of cases in the last two years has
reinforced Amazon’s position that it is merely an “online

1

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring).
3
See infra notes 30, 48, and accompanying text.
4
Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 400–01 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(holding that Amazon was neither a seller nor distributor of the defective product
because it never “held title” to the product, and therefore could not be held strictly
liable for injuries caused by it).
2
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marketplace,” and not a product distributor responsible for placing
defective products into consumers’ hands.5
This recent development will consider why that analysis of
Amazon’s role in the modern economy is erroneous and results in
judicial outcomes that are incongruous with the original intent and
rationales behind the American strict products liability regime. Part
II offers an in-depth discussion of the history of products liability in
the United States. The string of four recent cases where Amazon outteched strict products liability will be discussed in Part III. The
misapplication of legal standards in classifying Amazon’s role in the
distribution chain will be discussed in Part IV. In Part V, this recent
development will revisit the larger policy goals of tort law, including
deterrence, loss distribution, corrective justice, and fair
compensation to victims of unintentional negligence, and it will
show that the holdings in the cases described in Part III are
antagonistic to those goals. Part VI will briefly conclude that courts
should refocus their analysis to more closely adhere to the original
policy intent of strict products liability.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. History of Products Liability Law
Originally, common law recovery for injuries caused by
defective products depended upon the existence of privity between
the injured party and the manufacturer.6 This requirement came to
5
See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *3
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc,
No. 17–2738, 2018 WL 3546197 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018). See generally Oberdorf
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that Amazon
was more like a newspaper classified ads section than a seller or distributor of
goods).
6
See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. Ch. 1842)
(foreseeing the possibility of an “infinity of actions . . . [because if] the plaintiff
can sue [though lacking privity], every passenger, or even any person passing
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a
similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to
which I can see no limit, would ensue.”); see also Privity of Contract, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The relationship between the parties to a
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be a “fishbone in the throat of the law” that reflected the
socioeconomic climate of the nineteenth century and a judicial
hesitancy to place heavy burdens on the manufacturers that drove
economic growth.7 American courts latched onto the English
common law principle that privity was required to maintain a tort
action.8 Exceptions soon developed, however, particularly for torts
in relatively new or innovative industries which were often
hazardous, such as pharmacology in the mid-1800s.9 Further
evolutions in the law occurred in the early 1900s as a result of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.10 In that case, the New York Court
of Appeals added an element of negligence, and stated:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger . . .
. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will
be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests,
then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is
under a duty to make it carefully . . . . We have put aside the notion that
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence
may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put
the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source
in the law.11
contract, allowing them to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing
so. The requirement of privity has been relaxed under modern laws and doctrines
of implied warranty and strict liability, which allow a third-party beneficiary or
other foreseeable user to sue the seller of a defective product.”).
7
W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON: THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at
681 (5th ed. 1984).
8
See, e.g., The Germania, 10 F. Cas. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1878) (No. 5360); see also
The Mary Stewart, 10 F. 137, 139 (E.D. Va. 1881) (“[W]here a party is delinquent
in a duty imposed by contract, no one but a party to the contract can maintain an
action.”).
9
See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 397 (1852) (finding a duty of care in
the absence of privity). The pharmacist in question mislabeled a bottle containing
poisonous belladonna as dandelion extract, which is harmless. Id. He then
negligently provided the belladonna to Mrs. Winchester, who suffered substantial
acute health complications. Id. The court ruled that the pharmacist put her life in
“imminent danger,” and her husband was allowed to bring suit. Id. The pharmacist
owed the plaintiff a duty of care that was not dependent on a contractual
relationship; instead, the duty arose from the danger of the pharmaceutical
business and heightened safety concerns with respect to ingested products. Id.
10
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
11
Id. at 1053.

186

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 20: 181

The holding in MacPherson stood for the proposition that “the
manufacturer was liable for negligence to a purchaser if he put forth
a product which might reasonably be expected to be capable of
inflicting substantial harm if it were defective.”12 MacPherson is
significant because it conclusively removed the privity requirement
as a barrier to recovery in defective products liability cases, at least
in New York.13 Thus, by the time MacPherson was decided, the
general rule of nonliability for manufacturers, sellers, and
distributors had been whittled away by a number of exceptions,
largely leaving a showing of negligence as the plaintiff’s only
burden in a products liability case.
Eventually, a trio of products liability cases in California
introduced a theory of strict liability for defective products. The first
of these cases, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,14 was
the most influential for the theory of strict liability introduced in its
concurring opinion.15 Although the majority held that the defendant
was liable on a negligence theory similar to the one in MacPherson,
California Justice Roger Traynor’s concurrence has been
instrumental in the development of the strict products liability
regime in the United States. His concurrence stated that “a
manufacturer [should] incur[] an absolute liability when an article
that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings.”16 His comprehensive articulation of the
justifications for the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers
for injuries caused by defective products was the basis for the

12

Francis J. O’Brien, The History of Products Liability, 62 TUL. L. REV. 313,
318 (1988).
13
See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1055 (Bartlett, C.J., dissenting) (stating the
majority was discarding the general rule that “[the] furnisher of an article is not
liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence
in the construction, manufacture, or sale of such article”).
14
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
15
See id.
16
Id. at 461 (Traynor, J., concurring) (explaining why the concurrence sought
to apply a strict theory of liability, as opposed to the theory of res ipsa loquitur
that the controlling opinion in the case used to find liability).
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opinions which later implemented an American strict products
liability regime.17
Almost twenty years after his concurrence in Escola, Justice
Traynor wrote the majority opinion in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products18 to reflect the conclusions he had reached with respect to
strict products liability.19 In Greenman, the California Supreme
Court held that “it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was
injured while using the [product] in a way it was intended to be used
as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff
was not aware that made the [product] unsafe for its intended use.”20

17
See, e.g., East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S.
858, 865–66 (1986) (applying the strict liability principles set forth in Escola to
admiralty law); Putman v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 920–21 (5th Cir.
1964) (approving of Traynor’s concurrence in Escola).
18
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
19
See generally id. Notably, the true first-in-time “strict products liability”
majority opinion came in Henningson v. Bloomfield, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), where
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the driver of an automobile who was not
the title-holder (and therefore not in privity with the manufacturer or dealer) could
hold both the manufacturer and the dealer liable for injuries caused by a defective
steering gear, even in the absence of negligence.
The two later California cases (Greenman and Vandermark) are notable chiefly
due to their direct continuity from Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola,
which was the first concurrence to assert a theory of strict products liability. After
Escola, but prior to Henningson, there were a series of cases that managed to
assert strict products liability theories in dicta while also finding negligence or
privity on the facts of the case. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269
F.2d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 1959) (holding that “[a] plaintiff’s case does not fail for
failure to allege and prove privity between the parties,” but ultimately finding
liability due to an implied warranty of fitness that ran to the decedent and was
breached by the manufacturer); Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670, 680–83 (Minn.
1959) (holding that privity of contract is not required for liability to be found, but
ultimately finding that the defendant-manufacturer was a party to the sale, giving
rise to privity, and that the defendant negligently breached express and implied
warranties to the plaintiff); Spence v. Three Rivers Bldg. & Masonry Supply, 90
N.W.2d 873, 880–81 (Mich. 1958) (discussing the potential benefits of
abandoning the general rule of nonliability that has been “eaten away by
exceptions,” but ultimately finding the defendant liable for the plaintiff’s injuries
due to negligence).
20
Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
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In other words, the manufacturer was held strictly liable for the
defective design and manufacture of its product.21
One year later, Traynor wrote the last of three seminal products
liability opinions for a unanimous California Supreme Court in
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,22 which held that nonmanufacturing retailers and distributors can be strictly liable for
improper assembly or adjustment during the manufacturing
process.23 Subsequent decisions have held other types of thirdparties strictly liable for manufacturing or design defects, including
some corporate successors,24 franchisors,25 and promoters.26 In
contrast, some courts have refused to apply strict liability to groups
such as used-goods sellers27 or companies that finance purchases
made by others.28 Additionally, courts have held that strict liability
extends beyond the purchaser to parties like bystanders.29
21

Id.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1964).
23
See id. at 171–72 (“In some cases the retailer may be the only member of [the
overall producing and marketing] enterprise reasonably available to the injured
plaintiff. In other cases the retailer himself may play a substantial part in insuring
that the product is safe or may be in a position to exert pressure on the
manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s strict liability thus serves as an added
incentive to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer alike affords
maximum protection to the injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the
defendants, for they can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the
course of their continuing business relationship.” (emphasis added)).
24
See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977).
25
See Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 1979).
26
See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967).
27
See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303 (Or. 1979); see also
Wilke v. Woodhouse Ford, Inc., 774 N.W.2d 370, 381 (Neb. 2009) (holding that
a used-goods seller can be held liable only if found to be negligent) (“[A]
commercial dealer of used vehicles has a duty to conduct a reasonable inspection
of the vehicle prior to sale in order to determine whether there are any patent
defects which would make the vehicle unsafe for ordinary operation.”).
28
See generally Nath v. Nat’l Equip. Leasing Corp., 439 A.2d 633 (Pa. 1981)
(refusing to apply strict liability in a suit brought by a worker whose hand was
injured in the machine his employer had financed through the defendant).
29
See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (“If
anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater protection than the consumer or
user where injury to bystanders from the defect is reasonably foreseeable . . . . The
public policy which protects the driver and passenger of the car should also protect
the bystander, and where a driver or passenger of another car is injured due to
22
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Regardless of judicial extension or constraint of the doctrine, the
policy justifications set forth in Justice Traynor’s original Escola
concurrence were a constant force in the evolution of strict products
liability.
B. Policy and Law of Strict Liability
When Justice Traynor wrote his influential concurrence in
Escola, he recognized the need for products liability law to evolve
over time as industrially modernized, mass-produced products
became more prevalent and more dangerous, and public opinion
shifted toward resisting the insulation of manufacturers from tort
liability rather than prioritizing profit above all else.30 In Escola and
Greenman, Traynor was cognizant of the importance of lossspreading, as well as a moralistic type of liability based on social
responsibility.31 Additionally, he noted the potential for a strict
products liability regime to incentivize the creation of safer
products.32
1. Social Responsibility
Traynor’s principle policy justification for his concurrence in
Escola was that liability should be fixed on the party most
responsible for its introduction into the marketplace.33 He asserted
defects in the manufacture of an automobile and without any fault of their own,
they may recover from the manufacturer . . . .”).
30
Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 364 (1965) (“It took time, a long stretch of it from
1842’s Winterbottom v. Wright to 1916’s MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,
for the courts to articulate their disquiet over the ever-widening zones in which
the defective products of enterprise were set loose . . . . In many an opinion the
question festered without satisfactory answer: Can enterprise hew to the line of
the profit margin only by letting its victims fall where they may, redressing no
more than the privity-privileged?”).
31
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944);
see also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)
(“The purpose of [strict] liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves.”).
32
Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–41.
33
Id. at 441 (“If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is
to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause
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that the liability to the consumer is not fixed by contract or the “law
of sales”; rather, “the warranty of the manufacturer to the consumer
in absence of privity of contract rests on public policy.”34 “The
consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for
himself the soundness of a product . . . and his erstwhile vigilance
has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up
confidence by advertising and marketing . . . .”35 Therefore, he
argued, it was just, from a policy perspective, to attach liability to
the party who put a defective product on the open marketplace for
consumers to purchase.36
2. Loss-Spreading
Moreover, Traynor argued that not only should losses fall on the
parties most responsible for placing defective products on the
consumer market, but there is a sound economic rationale for such
burden shifting. Traynor expounded on this loss-spreading policy
rationale in his Escola concurrence.37 He wrote:
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet
its consequences. The cost of injury and the loss of time or health may
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one,
for the risk of the injury can be insured by the manufacturer and
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business . . . . However
intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they
may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general
one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection
and the manufacturer is best suited to afford such protection.38

Traynor later stated in Vandermark that “strict liability on the
manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the
upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market.”).
34
Id. at 442 (citing, inter alia, Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799,
803 (Cal. 1939); Ketterer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912); and
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. 1942)).
35
Id. at 443.
36
See Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A.2d 466, 473 (N.J. 1986) (“The
overriding goal of strict products liability is to protect consumers and promote
product safety. Manufacturers, by the act of marketing their products, are made
responsible to the public for injuries caused by those products — the ‘reparative’
function.”).
37
Escola, 150 P.2d at 441.
38
Id.
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injured plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they
can adjust the costs of such protection between them in the course
of their continuing business relationship.”39 Essentially, Traynor
argued that it would be most economically efficient for
manufacturers and retailers to bear the cost of risk due to defective
products because they are best situated to account for such cost in
the price of their goods.40 This way, the risk can be thinly spread
among a large number of consumers via nominal price increases.41
3. Incentivizing a Safer Marketplace for Consumers
The final policy rationale that Traynor identified for the
imposition of a strict products liability regime is that it incentivizes
safe products, not just reasonably careful manufacturing processes.42
He argued that “[i]t is to the public interest to discourage the
marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public.
If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to
the public interest to [impose strict liability].”43
Since Traynor’s foundational concurrence in Escola and his
opinions in Greenman and Vandermark, the Restatement’s
interpretation of the law has been that “[o]ne engaged in the business
of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes
a defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or
property caused by the defect.”44 The Restatement closely matches
the policy intent of Escola, Greenman, and Vandermark,
39

Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 172 (Cal. 1964) (“Retailers
like manufacturers are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the
public.”).
40
For a more complete discussion of the theories underlying the distributive
rationales that underpin tort law generally, see Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts
on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1970). But see
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1972) (questioning whether distributive rationales are an appropriate basis for the
imposition of liability, and instead arguing that corrective rationales may be
fairer).
41
See Calabresi, supra note 40, at 519.
42
Escola, 150 P.2d at 441; see also Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 725–
27 (Cal. 1970) (discussing the promotion of safety as justification for strict
products liability).
43
Escola, 150 P.2d at 441.
44
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1.
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specifically in that it extends liability to any party that makes a
defective product available to the marketplace.45
The modern strict products liability regime is the legacy of a
forward-thinking judiciary responding to an evolving marketplace.46
It took a considerable amount of time — over a century — for tort law
to evolve to adequately protect consumers from the dangers of
potentially defective products.47 However, the pinnacle of this
evolution — the adoption of a strict products liability regime in
Greenman — should not necessarily represent the conclusion of tort
law’s adaptation to a changing economy.48 The prevalence of ecommerce and new business models of increasing complexity and
connection to the international economy presents a challenge to the
capability of the strict products liability regime to continue to protect
consumers as it did in the past.
III. OUT-TECHING PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A string of recent cases has tested whether Amazon can be held
strictly liable for defective products advertised, purchased, and
distributed through its website and fulfillment services. The judicial
consensus thus far is that it cannot. However, this conclusion is not
consistent with the policy goals outlined by Justice Traynor in
45

Id. § 1 cmt. e (“Liability attaches even when such nonmanufacturing sellers
or distributors do not themselves render the products defective and regardless of
whether they are in a position to prevent defects from occurring.”); see also id.
§ 2 cmt. o (“[S]trict liability is imposed on a wholesale or retail seller who neither
knew nor should have known of the relevant risks, nor was in a position to have
taken action to avoid them, so long as a predecessor in the chain of distribution
could have acted reasonably to avoid the risks.”).
46
See G. EDWARD WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 247 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3rd ed. 2007) (describing
Traynor as the “architect” of a progressive, yet controversial, judiciary).
47
See Traynor, supra note 30, at 363–65 (noting that Winterbottom, which
“ignored strict liability, made short shrift of the issue of the manufacturer’s
negligence, carried the injured plaintiff to the doorstep of privity of contract, and
left him on the doorstep,” was decided in 1842, and Greenman, which “rejected
the fiction of warranty in toto, holding the manufacturer to strict liability in tort,”
was decided 121 years later, in 1963).
48
For an overview of prior economic scholarship concerning the ability of the
American common law to evolve over time, see generally David A. Reese, Does
the Common Law Evolve?, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 321 (1989).
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Escola and the evolution of products liability over time. In light of
an increasingly tech-based society and economy, the judiciary has a
responsibility to modernize products liability in a way that will
adequately protect consumers and promote safety in the common
marketplace.
A. Amazon’s Distribution Methods for Third-Party Vendors
Amazon is a multi-billion dollar e-commerce company that
offers millions of products for sale on its website, Amazon.com.49
Though some of these products are offered for sale by Amazon
itself, many are offered for sale by third-party vendors who use
Amazon’s site to access a wider consumer market.50 By placing their
products on Amazon’s site, third-party vendors receive access and
exposure to Amazon’s consumer base, and Amazon benefits by
expanding the products it offers on its site without the cost of
investing in additional inventory.51 Before a third-party vendor’s
product is purchased using the Amazon Marketplace service, it is
classified as either “Fulfilled by Amazon” (“FBA”), “Fulfilled by
Merchant” (“FBM”), or “Seller-Fulfilled Prime” (“SFP”),
depending on how the product will reach the consumer.52
1. Fulfillment by Amazon
If a vendor elects to use the FBA service, Amazon catalogs,
warehouses, packages, ships, and handles customer service
responsibilities for the vendor’s products.53 The FBA service also
offers a suite of software services that allows sellers to track sales
49

See Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2019).
Letter from Jeffrey P. Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, Inc., to its shareholders
(2017) (on file with author) (“In 2017, for the first time in our history, more than
half of the units sold on Amazon worldwide were from our third-party sellers,
including small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs).”); see also Press Release,
Amazon.com, Inc., Sellers on Amazon are Thriving: Fulfillment by Amazon
Delivered More than 2 Billion Items for Sellers Worldwide in 2016 (Jan. 4, 2017)
(on file with author).
51
See Reuters, Amazon’s Third-Party Sellers Had Record-Breaking Sales in
2016, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/04/amazonmarketplace-sales/.
52
Fulfillment by Amazon, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2V5FDCG (last visited
Mar. 5, 2019).
53
Id.
50
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performance, maintain inventory levels, and launch advertising
campaigns through Amazon.54 Additionally, Amazon handles
payment processing by accepting money from buyers and then
remitting the net cost of the product back to the third-party vendor.55
In return, Amazon collects extensive fulfillment fees and storage
fees.56 FBA can be especially attractive to third-party vendors
because it allows them to pay Amazon to handle basic distribution
services without the need to make significant capital investments in
warehousing or supply-chain logistics themselves.
Perhaps most importantly, though, is that third-party vendors
using FBA are able to market their products to Amazon’s “Prime”
members. Prime members pay $12.99 per month (or, for an annual
subscription, a discounted yearly payment of $119.99) to receive a
number of benefits from Amazon, including free shipping.57 A 2018
report estimated Amazon’s Prime membership included 95 million
people, and that Prime members spend, on average, approximately
$1,400 per year on merchandise bought through Amazon (compared
to $600 of yearly spending on the site for the average non-Prime
customer).58
54

Fulfillment by Amazon Programs, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2NM5Za1 (last
visited Mar. 5, 2019).
55
How Fulfillment by Amazon Works, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2e1QLLJ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2019).
56
For Amazon’s listing of their FBA fees, see Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA)
Fees and Rate Structure, AMAZON, https://services.amazon.com/fulfillment-byamazon/pricing.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
57
Amazon Prime, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2HhMmWr (last visited Mar. 5,
2019) (illustrating that, in general, Prime members can expect free two-day
shipping on Prime products, but some Prime members can receive free same-day
delivery or one-day shipping on certain qualifying orders).
58
Amazon Prime Membership Growth Slows, CONSUMER INTEL. RES.
PARTNERS (July 20, 2018), https://www.cirpllc.com/blog/2018/9/25/amazonprime-membership-growth-slows; cf. MICHAEL R. LEVIN & JOSHUA N. LOWITZ,
CONSUMER INTEL. RESEARCH PARTNERS, AMAZON PRIME HITS 90 MILLION US
MEMBERS (Oct. 18, 2017) (reporting that the average gap between Prime member
spending and non-Prime consumer spending on Amazon was roughly $600 in
2017, which shows that the gap between Prime member spending and non-Prime
consumer spending widened between 2017 and 2018 by as much as 16 percent,
while Prime membership increased by approximately 5.5 percent over the same
period).
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2. Fulfillment by Merchant
At the other end of the spectrum — when a product is FBM —
the third-party vendor is responsible for packing and shipping its
product to the buyer, and Amazon only handles payment
processing.59 The obvious drawbacks to FBM are that the third-party
vendor must store its own inventory, package its own products, pay
for shipping and handling, and perform customer service
responsibilities, including product returns and exchanges.60
However, this could be a beneficial arrangement if the third-party
vendor can perform these services for itself at a lower cost than
Amazon’s FBA fees. Additionally, some research suggests that
third-party vendors choosing FBM distribution are at a marketing
disadvantage when it comes to the “buy-box.”61 Perhaps the biggest
disadvantage to third-party vendors that choose FBM is that they are
not able to market directly to Amazon’s high-spending Prime

59

John E. Lincoln, Fulfillment by Amazon vs. Fulfillment by Merchant vs.
Seller-Fulfilled Prime (The Ultimate Guide), IGNITE VISIBILITY,
https://ignitevisibility.com/fulfillment-amazon-vs-fulfillment-merchant-vsseller-fulfilled-prime-ultimate-guide/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
60
Id.
61
The “buy-box” is the area on an Amazon product page that includes the “Add
to Cart” button and the information surrounding it. When a third-party vendor is
said to have “won” the buy-box, it means that when a purchaser clicks “Add to
Cart,” the winning third-party vendor’s product will be automatically placed in
the purchaser’s cart before other third-party vendors’ products will. All other
products sold by third-party sellers are grouped into a link that says “[x number]
new from [$x price],” which leads to a listing of all third-party vendors offering
that particular product. Competition for the buy-box only occurs where multiple
third-party vendors offer the same unused product for sale (i.e., “private label
sellers,” or sellers who are the exclusive sellers of a particular product,
automatically win the buy-box for their products (with a few exceptions under
certain circumstances); resellers of such products would have to be sought out by
purchasers by clicking the “[x number] used from [$x price]” button). Oftentimes,
the buy-box is simply won by the third-party vendor offering the lowest price, but
this is not always the case. It is difficult to beat Amazon itself in a competition for
the buy-box, but it is possible in rare circumstances. For an excellent discussion
of the algorithm behind winning Amazon’s buy-box, see Le Chen et al., An
Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon Marketplace, in WWW '16
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 25TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD WIDE WEB
1339–49 (2016), http://www2016.ca/proceedings.html.
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members, but sellers can reach those consumers by opting into SFP
distribution.
3. Seller-Fulfilled Prime
SFP combines the all-important access to Amazon’s highspending Prime members with the extra control over shipping and
warehousing costs afforded by FBM.62 While access to Prime
members could substantially increase revenue for a third-party
vendor, it must foot the bill for any inventory storage overhead or
shipping and handling costs; these costs will not be outsourced to
Amazon like they would be under FBA.63 However, not all thirdparty vendors will qualify for SFP, especially because the criteria
for qualification are extensive.64 For example, third-party vendors
must first complete a SFP trial period in which they are required to
process orders with a zero-day handling time.65 Once the trial period
is complete, they must offer premium shipping options, ship greater
than 99 percent of their orders on time, have an order cancellation
rate of less than 0.5 percent, use certain Amazon-approved carriers,
and still must allow Amazon to handle all customer service
inquiries.66
B. The Implication of Distribution Methods on Amazon’s
Liability for Defective Products
Note that in the cases below, FBA is the predominant method by
which the third-party vendors have placed their products into the
hands of consumers.67 The exception is Oberdorf v. Amazon.com,
62

Seller Fulfilled Prime, AMAZON, https://services.amazon.com/services/
seller-fulfilled-prime.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2019).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
No case law has emerged regarding defective products fulfilled by SFP,
though if it had, this recent development might argue that it would be less
appropriate (though not totally inappropriate) for strict liability to attach to
Amazon through SFP products than it would be for it to attach to Amazon through
FBA products. See, e.g., discussion infra Part IV.A, V.A, and V.D. This recent
development does not argue that strict liability should attach to Amazon for
defective products fulfilled by the FBM method.
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Inc.,68 where the third-party seller used FBM and assumed
responsibility for shipping and warehousing the defective product in
question.69 This factually distinguishes Oberdorf from Allstate,70
Fox,71 and Eberhart,72 in which the third-party sellers used the FBA
service.73 The sellers’ use of FBA substantially increased Amazon’s
role in placing the defective products into consumers’ hands. For
example, Amazon took charge of warehousing, packing, shipping,
handling, customer service, and, in some cases, it assumed the
responsibility to notify purchasers of potentially hazardous defects
in products sold by third-parties.74 Additionally, the sellers’ use of
FBA economically benefitted Amazon. For example, in each of the
cases where the seller utilized FBA, Amazon collected significant
fees from them for using the FBA service, increased the Prime
product offerings on its site, and received advertising benefits from
shipping the defective products in Amazon-branded boxes sealed
with Amazon-branded tape.75
1. Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.
The earliest case in this series is Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc.76
In Oberdorf, the plaintiff “suffered severe and permanent injuries to
her left eye when the retractable leash she was using suddenly
malfunctioned” and “violently” struck her in the face.77 Oberdorf
purchased the leash on the Amazon Marketplace from a third-party

68

295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
Id. at 498.
70
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197
(D.N.J. July 24, 2018).
71
Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628 (M.D.
Tenn. May 30, 2018).
72
Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
73
See Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *3; Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2
(explaining that Amazon disputes that the third-party vendor used FBA, even
though plaintiff presented evidence that it did; the court did not find this fact
dispositive nor material in either light); Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 395.
74
See, e.g., Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7.
75
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
76
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
77
Id. at 497.
69
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vendor called “The Furry Gang.”78 The Furry Gang opted for the
FBM method of fulfillment, and Amazon was minimally involved
in placing the leash on the market.79 As a result, the court granted
summary judgment in Amazon’s favor, concluding that “[t]he
Amazon Marketplace serves as a sort of newspaper classified ad
section, connecting potential consumers with eager sellers in an
efficient, modern, streamlined manner.”80 The court found that “an
online sales listing service like Amazon Marketplace” does not
qualify as a “seller” and thus cannot be held strictly liable for
product defects.81 The ruling is currently under appeal.82
Oberdorf is significant because other courts have cited it as
authority to conclude that Amazon is not strictly liable for defective
products sold through the FBA service, even though the third-party
vendor in Oberdorf was highly distinguishable from the other thirdparty vendors in Part III because it used the FBM method of
distribution.83 Further, the ruling of the district court in Oberdorf still
raises substantial policy questions regarding the ability of injured
plaintiffs to recover when third-party sellers prove to be
unreachable.84 This recent development does not argue that Amazon
78
Id. at 497–98 (also noting that plaintiffs were unable to contact “The Furry
Gang” or the true manufacturer of the offending leash following the accident).
79
Id. at 498.
80
Id. at 501.
81
Id. (citing Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., 562 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1989)).
82
An online recording of the oral arguments of this appeal can be found at:
Online audio file: Oral Arguments, Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., CV 18–1041,
held by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/181041HeatherR.Oberdorf,etal.v.Amazon.Com,Inc.mp3 (on file with author).
83
See, e.g., Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 399 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (“[I]t appears that every court to consider the question of Amazon’s liability
has concluded that Amazon is not strictly liable for defective products sold on its
marketplace.”) (citing, inter alia, Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 499–501; Fox v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *8 (M.D. Tenn.
May 30, 2018); Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018
WL 3546197, at *5–12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018)); see also Fox, 2018 WL 2431628,
at *7 (“The Court notes that the conclusion reached here is consistent with that
reached by other courts addressing the liability of Amazon under other products
liability statutes.”) (citing Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 496); Allstate, 2018 WL
3546197, at *10 (finding Oberdorf persuasive, but not controlling).
84
See infra notes 163–72 and accompanying text.
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should be held strictly liable for FBM products; instead, it argues
that Amazon’s complacency in allowing third-party vendors to
escape accountability for defective products sold through its online
marketplace implicates negligence theories of liability and suggests
a potential need for more effective consumer protection laws.85
2. Allstate New Jersey Insurance Company v. Amazon.com,
Inc.
The second case involves a defective laptop battery that
plaintiff’s insured (Ms. Wilmot) purchased through the Amazon
Marketplace from a third-party vendor using the FBA service.86 Ms.
Wilmot, however, argued that she reasonably believed that Amazon
was the true seller of the battery because Amazon charged to her
credit card the purchase price of the battery. 87 Additionally, the
“Prime” designation of the product (allowing Ms. Wilmot to take
advantage of free expedited shipping) and the branding of the
packaging in which the battery arrived (an Amazon-branded box
sealed by Amazon-branded tape) supported the reasonableness of
her belief.88 While Ms. Wilmot was away, the laptop battery caught
fire.89 Ms. Wilmot’s house burned down, and though she was able
to save her dog from the blaze, her cats did not survive.90 “After the
fire at issue, the Amazon Product Safety Department sent Ms.
Wilmot an email advising her of a potential fire hazard with the
laptop battery. Amazon processed a refund for Ms. Wilmot in the

85

See infra notes 205–26 and accompanying text.
Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (stating that the
action was brought on behalf of Ms. Wilmot by her insurance company for claims
associated with injuries sustained by her which were caused by the defective
laptop battery).
87
Id. (noting that the factual dispute over the reasonableness of Ms. Wilmot’s
belief that Amazon was the true seller of the laptop battery was immaterial to
whether or not it should be held strictly liable for the battery) (“While the
consumer’s subjective belief about the identity of the seller is not determinative,
there may be instances where Amazon’s interaction with the consumer might
transform it into a ‘product seller.’”).
88
Id.
89
Id. at *2.
90
Id.
86
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form of a gift card and advised her to dispose of ‘the defective
battery.’”91 Additionally, Amazon’s “A-to-Z Guarantee” states:
We want you to buy with confidence anytime you make a purchase on
the Amazon.com website . . . ; that’s why we guarantee purchases from
third-party sellers when payment is made via the Amazon.com website .
. . . The condition of the item you buy and its timely delivery are
guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-Z Guarantee.92

Despite the extensive involvement Amazon had in the process
that ultimately led to the defective battery being placed in Ms.
Wilmot’s possession, including warehousing, marketing,
transaction handling, branding, shipping, customer service,
defective product notification, and the provision of guarantees as to
the safety of products sold on its site, the court here found Amazon
not strictly liable for the substantial damages caused by the defective
battery.93 In defending its conclusion, the court stated that Amazon
is not a “product seller” under the New Jersey Products Liability Act
(“N.J. PLA”).94
The N.J. PLA allows a plaintiff to hold the “manufacturer or
seller” of a defective product strictly liable for his or her injuries
caused by that defective product.95 The Act defines “product seller”
as “any [entity] who [in the normal course of business] sells;
91

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at *3. Ambiguity in Amazon’s A-to-Z guarantee could be reasonably
construed as an express warranty that a product sold by a third-party vendor will
not be defective, but this recent development will not explore that possibility.
93
Id. at *7–8.
94
Id. (holding that Amazon is not a “product seller” in spite of the expansive
definition of “product seller” under the N.J. PLA) (“By the PLA’s broad language,
‘any party involved in placing a product in the line of commerce’ can meet the
definition of a ‘product seller.’ This language is consistent with the principles of
New Jersey strict products liability law, which hold that, generally, a consumer
injured by a defective product may bring a strict liability action against any
business entity in the chain of distribution . . . In that regard, although a distributor
and a retailer may be innocent conduits in the sale of the defective product, they
remain liable to the injured party . . . Thus, an entity can be within the chain of
distribution even without taking possession of the product . . . The absence of the
original manufacturer or producer does not deprive the injured party of a cause of
action . . . . Here, Amazon may have technically been a part of the chain of
distribution, but it never exercised control over the product sufficient to make it a
‘product seller’ under the PLA.” (internal citations omitted)).
95
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (2019).
92
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distributes . . . packages; labels; markets; . . . or otherwise is involved
in placing a product in the line of commerce.”96 It excludes sellers
of real property, providers of professional services when the essence
of the transaction is the “furnishing of judgment, skill or services,”
and persons who act solely in a financial capacity with respect to the
defective product.97
The court dispensed with strict liability under the N.J. PLA by
holding that Amazon never exercised control over the defective
product.98 Notwithstanding the absence of any control requirement
in the N.J. PLA, New Jersey courts have maintained this
requirement, which is rooted in a 1979 products liability case in
which a New Jersey Appellate Court held that “even when there is
‘no doubt’ that a party is ‘in the chain of distribution and contributed
to placing the product in the stream of commerce,’ it, nonetheless,
‘must be shown that [the party] exercised control over the
product.’”99 However, this control requirement is a judicial
invention that was never meant to become a test for whether an
entity is a seller.100 In the 1979 case, Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs,
Inc.,101 the defendant was a broker, and brokers are already excluded
from the N.J. PLA.102 Regardless of whether it is actually appropriate
to use control as a test for whether an entity is a seller, Amazon
96

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018); see infra note 106 for the full text of the
statute.
97
Id.
98
Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *7–8.
99
Id. (quoting Lyons v. Premo Pharm. Labs, Inc., 406 A.2d 185, 191–92 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 412 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1979)).
100
See Lyons, 406 A.2d at 191–92 (holding that a broker was not strictly liable
for a defective product because it never “exercised control” over the product) (“It
is undisputed that [the defendant] never had physical control over the [defective
product]. It merely arranged the sale; the [product] was shipped directly from [the
manufacturer] to [the plaintiff].”); see also Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
Chevrolet Motor Div., 326 A.2d 673, 678 n.3 (N.J. 1974) (“Proof that a product
was defective while in the control of the manufacturer also establishes that it was
defective while in the control of the retailer. However, the converse obviously is
not true.”).
101
406 A.2d 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), cert. denied, 412 A.2d 774
(N.J. 1979).
102
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018); see infra note 106 for the full text of
the statute.
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performed functions that the court in Lyons specifically noted that
the broker did not perform.103 Amazon performs many functions
through its FBA service that go beyond “merely arrang[ing] the
sale.”104 Additionally, Amazon performs multiple roles through
FBA that are specifically enumerated under the N.J. PLA as roles
which would classify an entity as a seller.105 By the plain language
of the statute (i.e., by disregarding the statutorily-absent control
requirement and considering the plain language of the statute as
applied to Amazon’s role in fulfilling FBA products), Amazon
should be held strictly liable for defective FBA products.106
In any event, a strong argument can still be made that Amazon
exercised some degree of control over the product. Apart from the
fact that Amazon was in physical contact with the product while it
was warehoused at an Amazon facility and when it was being
packed and shipped to Ms. Wilmot, it also exercised control over
whether the product was “recommended” to her by its internal
algorithms.107 For products that are being sold by multiple third103

Lyons, 406 A.2d at 191–92.
Id.; see also Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 762 A.2d 311, 320 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding that courts should look to whether the defendant’s
role “was that of a facilitator rather than an ‘active participant’ in the transaction,”
with particular focus on whether the defendant “[ever] had physical control of the
product [or] had merely arranged the sale”); see Fulfillment by Amazon Programs,
supra note 54.
105
See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL
3546197, at *7 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (specifically, Amazon distributed,
packaged, labeled, marketed, and otherwise was involved in the placing of the
defective product in the line of commerce); see also supra notes 95–96 and
accompanying text.
106
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018) (“‘Product seller’ means any person
who, in the course of a business conducted for that purpose: sells; distributes;
leases; installs; prepares or assembles a manufacturer’s product according to the
manufacturer’s plan, intention, design, specifications or formulations; blends;
packages; labels; markets; repairs; maintains or otherwise is involved in placing
a product in the line of commerce. The term ‘product seller’ does not include: (1)
A seller of real property; or (2) A provider of professional services in any case in
which the sale or use of a product is incidental to the transaction and the essence
of the transaction is the furnishing of judgment, skill or services; or (3) Any person
who acts in only a financial capacity with respect to the sale of a product.”).
107
For an in-depth discussion of Amazon’s recommender system, called itembased collaborative filtering, see generally Brent Smith & Greg Linden, Two
104
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party vendors, Amazon also uses an internal algorithm to determine
who will win the buy-box; i.e., its algorithms determine from which
entity a consumer will purchase a particular item when they click
“add to cart.”108 This dual-control over what a consumer is exposed
to is analogous to a shop-owner rotating his stock so that his
customers only see the products he wants them to buy, pushing the
rest to the back of the shelf. The algorithmic control over product
visibility, combined with its physical control over the defective
laptop battery during certain stages of the distribution process, is
representative of a degree of overall control that should place
Amazon squarely within the “control” requirement described by the
Allstate court, qualifying it as a seller subject to strict liability under
the N.J. PLA.
3. Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc.
In the next case, Fox, the eponymous plaintiff used Amazon to
purchase a hoverboard for her son as a Christmas gift in late 2015.109
As in Oberdorf and Allstate, the plaintiff purchased the product
through the Amazon Marketplace from a third-party vendor
allegedly using the FBA service.110 Amazon charged the entire
amount of the hoverboard to the plaintiff’s credit card, and the
receipt was sent to the plaintiff by Amazon.111 When the product
arrived, it was in an Amazon-branded box sealed by Amazonbranded tape.112 The box containing the product displayed no
information about the third-party seller or the manufacturer of the
product.113 A few weeks after Christmas, the hoverboard caused a

Decades of Recommender Systems at Amazon.com, 21 IEEE INTERNET
COMPUTING 12 (2017).
108
See Chen et al., supra note 61.
109
Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018).
110
Id. at *2 (Amazon disputes that the third-party vendor used FBA, but
plaintiff presented evidence that it did, specifically that the box the hoverboard
arrived in “contained the trademark ‘Amazon’ on the outside.” The court did not
find this fact dispositive nor material in either light.).
111
Id. (noting that, had Fox requested a refund, it would have been processed
through and paid by Amazon).
112
Id.
113
Id.
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fire that destroyed the plaintiff’s home and caused physical and
psychological injuries to her and her family.114
Unlike Oberdorf and Allstate, Amazon was directly aware of the
safety risks posed by the hoverboard in question.115 On November
30, 2015, in the midst of a three-month investigation into the safety
of hoverboards purchased on the Amazon website, Amazon CEO
Jeff Bezos received an email informing him of a hoverboard,
purchased from the same third-party vendor that Fox purchased
from, that “burst into flames” with “fireworks-like explosions.”116 A
December 10, 2015 report written by the safety team overseeing the
investigation “identified at least 17 complaints of hoverboard fires
or explosions in the United States alone from hoverboards sold on
Amazon’s website.”117 The leader of the safety team felt that all
hoverboards being sold on the Amazon site were potentially
dangerous because the risk of “fires and explosions were spread
across many manufacturers, many brands, and many component
parts.”118 In describing Amazon’s reaction to the safety team’s
report, the court wrote:
Amazon decided to recommend the international sales team suspend all
hoverboard sales. During that meeting, Amazon also decided to send a
“non-alarmist” email to United States hoverboard purchasers. After
being told of the decision to suspend all hoverboard sales worldwide, the
third highest Amazon executive sent an email on December 10, 2015,
cautioning other Amazon employees that the email to customers would
be “headline news.” [The email stated “There have been news reports of
safety issues involving products like the one you purchased that contain
rechargeable lithium-ion batteries.”] Amazon stopped selling
hoverboards in the United States and worldwide starting on December
11, 2015.119

Again, as in Allstate, the court here ruled that Amazon was not
strictly liable for defective products sold through its Marketplace
and delivered using its FBA service.120 Though the Tennessee
114

Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at *4–5 (internal citations omitted).
120
Id. at *7.
115
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Products Liability Act, like the N.J. PLA, requires strict liability for
sellers and distributors of defective products, the court held that
Amazon was neither a seller nor a distributor.121 However, in
summarizing the policy arguments made by the plaintiff to extend
strict liability to Amazon, the court noted that “[a]lthough one might
agree these policy implications justify extending liability to
businesses like Amazon, that decision is for the Tennessee
legislature as it would require, in the Court’s view, an expansion of
the Act’s current definition of ‘seller.’”122
4. Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc.
The most recent products liability suit brought against Amazon,
Eberhart, follows a fact pattern similar to Allstate and Fox. The
plaintiff in Eberhart ordered a French press coffeemaker that was
displayed for sale by a third-party vender on Amazon’s website
using the FBA service.123 He alleged that while washing the
coffeepot, which was labeled as the “CoffeeGet 6 cup 27 oz. French
Press Coffee Maker with thick heat resistant glass,” the glass
shattered and caused significant lacerations to his hand, resulting in
permanent nerve damage.124 Although the third-party vendor paid
Amazon to warehouse and deliver its products through FBA
services, the court noted that Amazon never took title of the
coffeemaker, nor did it write, edit, or substantively review the
information contained on the product detail page it hosted on its
website.125
121
Id. at *6 (holding that Amazon was not a seller because it never took title to
the hoverboard, notwithstanding the absence of any title requirement in statute,
precedent, or persuasive authority); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7)
(“‘Seller’ includes a retailer, wholesaler, or distributor, and means any individual
or entity engaged in the business of selling a product whether such sale is for
resale, or for use or consumption.”).
122
Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *8 n.4 (“To the extent Plaintiffs suggest the court
should apply the spirit of the law rather than the actual text, the Court declines to
do so.”).
123
Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
124
Id.; see also Coffeeget 6 Cup 27 Oz French Press Coffee Maker with Thick
Heat Resistant Glass by coffeeGet: Kitchen and Dining, AMAZON,
https://amzn.to/2CNSPoI (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (showing that the product is
no longer available through Amazon).
125
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 395–96.
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The law in New York, as in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Tennessee, is that a “manufacturer of defective products . . . may be
held strictly liable for injuries caused by its products, regardless of
privity, foreseeability, or due care,” and that strict liability is also
extended to “certain sellers, such as retailers and distributors.”126
Although the court in Eberhart cited a New York case that identified
the lack of a concrete definition for “distributor” as it applies to strict
products liability, it ruled that “the failure to take title to a product
places an entity on the outside [of the chain of distribution].”127 The
court acknowledged that the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability does not include a title requirement, but dismissed this
complication by stating that “the Restatement excludes ‘product
distribution facilitators’ . . . — such as advertisers, sales personnel,
and auctioneers — from the definition of distributors.”128 Amazon’s
relationship to the distribution of the coffeemaker, however, goes
far beyond the exclusions in the Restatement, and the Eberhart
court’s reliance on a title requirement is misplaced. The misapplied
legal foundations in the cases above are merely the disturbing
fountainhead to the eventual erosion of the strict products liability
regime in the modern economy.
IV. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
The courts in Eberhart, Fox, and Allstate may have
overgeneralized the implications of the ruling in Oberdorf and relied
on it too much in the absence of other case law directly dealing with
Amazon’s potential liability for defective products. However, there
are significant and material factual differences between Amazon’s
126

Id. at 397 (citing Finerty v. Abex Corp., 51 N.E.3d 555 (2016), and Sukljian
v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 503 N.E.2d 1358 (1986)).
127
Id. at 398 (citing McCormack v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., No. 110733/10,
2011 WL 1643590, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 2011) (“Neither of the parties has
provided the court with a New York definition of ‘distributor’ as it applies to strict
products liability, and the court could not find a statute or case on point.”). But
see Brumbaugh v. CEJJ, Inc., 152 A.D.2d 69, 70–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(holding that a manufacturer’s “exclusive marketing agent” was strictly liable for
injuries caused by a defective product, even though the agent had never taken
“actual possession, title, or control”).
128
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 20 cmt. g (AM.
LAW INST. 1998)).
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role in the distribution of the defective dog leash in Oberdorf and its
role in the distribution of products it fulfills through the FBA
service.129 Chiefly, the courts in Eberhart, Fox, and Allstate
understated Amazon’s involvement in placing defective products on
the consumer market. They also problematically fixated on the idea
that Amazon must have taken title to the defective product in order
to be found strictly liable for injuries resulting from it.
A. Amazon: Merely an Online Marketplace?
The most troublesome mistake that the courts in Allstate, Fox,
and Eberhart made when analyzing Amazon’s potential liability is
that they all cited to Oberdorf to support the assertion that Amazon
is merely an online marketplace, playing a role analogous to that of
a flea market, auctioneer, broker, or newspaper classified-ads
section.130 Although these analogies are more accurate based on the
facts in Oberdorf because the third-party vendor in that case used
FBM, they do not translate as smoothly onto the facts of the other
three cases in which third-party vendors utilized FBA.
The court in Oberdorf accurately pointed out that Amazon is
more akin to an auctioneer, or to a newspaper’s classified-ads
section, in its potential liability for the defective dog leash sold and
fulfilled by a third-party vendor on its site.131 However, it is
unmistakable that Amazon’s direct involvement in the introduction
of FBA products into the common marketplace is far greater than
the examples the court alludes to in Oberdorf.132 In Oberdorf,
Amazon had no physical interaction with the defective dog leash,
and its role did not extend far beyond the provision of a platform for
the third-party vendor, “The Furry Gang,” to list its product to
potential buyers and facilitate payment by the purchaser to The

129

See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text.
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197,
at *10 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013,
2018 WL 2431628, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d
at 399.
131
Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
132
See discussion supra Part III.A for an analysis of the major differences in
distribution methods available to third-party sellers.
130
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Furry Gang.133 This is highly analogous to the service provided by
Craigslist or a traditional newspaper classified ads section.
However, it would be a grievous error to treat this analysis of
Amazon’s role in FBM transactions as a blanket generalization
applicable to Amazon’s role in SFP or FBA transactions. Clearly,
Amazon is more involved in, and receives more benefit from,
directly facilitating the distribution of FBA products.134 There are
also general distinctions between Amazon and other online
auctioneers or classified ads sites that transcend commonly-used
distribution methods. When its interface is compared to other
online-auctioneers, Amazon is clearly distinguishable. For example,
eBay is much more similar to an auctioneer because it requires
interactivity on the part of buyers placing active bids.135
Additionally, the “seller information” is prominently located next to
the bidding area in eBay’s user interface. Amazon, on the other
hand, only displays “Sold by [Seller] and Fulfilled by Amazon” in
small-type under the area indicating whether the item is in stock or
not, buried in an information-dense area of the user-interface called
the “buy-box.”136 Similarly, when compared to online classified ad
services, such as Craigslist, Amazon is again clearly
distinguishable.137 Although seller information is not directly
133

Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 501.
For instance, Amazon collects fees from third-party vendors to warehouse,
catalog, ship, pack, handle, and facilitate payment services and customer service
responsibilities. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
135
See Inman v. Technicolor USA, Inc., No. 11-666, 2011 WL 5829024, at *5–
6 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2011) (holding that eBay is not strictly liable for defective
products because it is not a “seller”). There are some items on eBay where bids
are not necessary in order to purchase them; however, eBay is most similar to an
auctioneer when it facilitates bids on behalf of sellers.
136
See generally Le Chen et al., supra note 61 (offering an economic analysis
of the “buy-box”).
137
See McDonald v. LG Elecs. USA, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 533, 536 (D. Md.
2016) (holding that Amazon was distinguishable from Craigslist because Amazon
does not have immunity under 47 U.S.C. § 230 for defective products sold on its
website, because although § 230 “would immunize Amazon from liability for
‘objectionable written content’ . . . § 230 does not state anything about protecting
websites that sell, and profit from the sale of, defective products”) (citations
omitted); cf. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735(RMB), 2009 WL
1704355, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (holding that Craigslist is immunized by
134
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available through Craigslist, the means to directly contact the seller
are available, unlike on Amazon where customer service requests
and inquiries go through Amazon customer support. The essential
role played by the Facebook Marketplace is merely to facilitate
contact between buyer and seller, and the seller’s information is
more openly available to purchasers than on Craigslist.
Additionally, the nonprofessional listings on Craigslist and
Facebook make clear that Craigslist and Facebook themselves are
not the seller, whereas Amazon branding is abundant throughout the
Amazon site.138
Apart from these general distinctions, the fact remains that
Amazon is not merely an online company or product-listing
platform.139 Its physical reach is extensive — it owns or leases more
than 250 million square feet of space, including space for
warehousing, fulfillment centers, and physical stores.140 Statistics
from the United States Department of Commerce show that ecommerce represented thirteen percent of total retail sales in the
United States, and Amazon alone accounted for nearly half of e47 U.S.C. § 230 in a defective warning products liability suit, because “[t]he
alleged handgun advertisement identified in the [Amended] Complaint was
provided by another information content provider, not Craigslist”; and “the
[Amended] Complaint on its face improperly seeks to treat Craigslist as the
publisher or speaker of the alleged advertisement”).
138
See infra note 189.
139
See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J.
710 (2017) (illustrating that Amazon is more than just an online marketplace by
describing its business activities, conduct, and structure from an antitrust
perspective).
140
Amazon.com, Inc., 2017 Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 16 (Jan. 24, 2018);
see also Esther Fung, Amazon to Shut All U.S. Pop-Up Stores as It Rethinks
Physical
Retail
Strategy,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Mar.
6,
2019),
https://on.wsj.com/2WFVJU3 (subscription required) (reporting that Amazon is
set to open additional locations of physical Amazon bookstores and “four star
stores”); Esther Fung & Heather Haddon, Amazon to Launch New Grocery-Store
Business, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://on.wsj.com/2GSfkwG (subscription
required) (“Amazon.com, Inc. is planning to open dozens of grocery stores in
several major U.S. cities . . . .”); Heather Haddon & Laura Stevens, Amazon Tests
Its Cashierless Technology for Bigger Stores, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2018),
https://on.wsj.com/2Q5TACm (subscription required) (reporting that Amazon is
considering expanding “cashierless” transaction capability in physical retail
locations).
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commerce sales.141 Furthermore, Amazon is increasingly involved
in the delivery of products, taking on the role of a common carrier
in some instances.142 In fact, it listed “companies that provide
fulfillment and logistics services” as competitors on its 2018 annual
report.143 In 2019, Amazon made significant investments in
expanding last-mile delivery services as well as its Prime Air
delivery system.144 Currently, Amazon is developing its drone
delivery capabilities, and CEO Jeff Bezos predicted that such a
delivery method could be commonplace as soon as 2022.145

141

Fareeha Ali, U.S. Ecommerce Sales Grow 15.0% in 2018, DIGITAL COM.
360 (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/article/usecommerce-sales/ (reporting that Amazon was responsible for 40 percent of U.S.
e-commerce sales and 43.3 percent of U.S. e-commerce gains in 2017); Jack Nicas
& Laura Stevens, Wal-Mart and Google Team Up to Challenge Amazon, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://on.wsj.com/2xsh4DQ (subscription required);
Patrick Sisson, 9 Facts About Amazon’s Unprecedented Warehouse Empire,
CURBED (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2017/11/21/16686150/blackfriday-2018-amazon-warehouse-fulfillment.
142
See, e.g., James Chrisman, Amazon Can Now Deliver All Your Packages on
the Same Day, THRILLIST (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.thrillist.com/news
/nation/amazon-day-feature-packages-delivered-same-time (showing Amazon’s
increasing role in the logistics of product delivery); James Vincent, Amazon has
Made its Own Autonomous Six-Wheeled Delivery Robot, VERGE (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/ 2019/1/23/18194566/amazon-scout-autonomous-sixwheeled-delivery-robot (showing Amazon’s emphasis on beginning to deliver
products itself); Elizabeth Weise & Mike Snider, Amazon is Testing its Own
Delivery Service. If it Succeeds, Expect a Price War, USA TODAY (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/02/09/amazon-reportedlydeveloping-delivery-service-compete-fedex-and-ups/322725002/ (discussing an
Amazon pilot program that would pick up FBA products from sellers and deliver
them to Amazon fulfillment centers for warehousing until they are sold).
143
Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2019).
144
Adam Levy, Amazon is Looking More and More Like a Shipping Company,
MOTLEY FOOL (Feb. 19, 2019, 9:32 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing
/2019/02/19/amazon-is-looking-more-and-more-like-a-shipping-co.aspx (“The
company’s recent efforts to grow its fleet of cargo planes, expand its network of
air hubs, and boost its investments in solving the last-mile delivery problem are a
big indication that it’s not just looking to supplement FedEx and UPS capacity
anymore . . . . Amazon is starting to consider itself a shipping business.”).
145
David Streitfeld, Amazon Is Now Second to Cross $1 Trillion Line, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2018, at B1.
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The lasting applicability of old-media comparisons or preinternet age analogies is tenuous; the integration of the modern
economy with internet services and e-commerce websites is
continuous and unlikely to regress.146 It is important that courts not
parse language to cleave a large and growing section of the economy
out of the American strict products liability regime. Exempting ecommerce entities from this regime, while still imposing it on other
entities with comparable roles in the distribution of potentially
defective products, raises substantial horizontal equity concerns that
could have drastic long-term consequences.
B. The Improper Fixation on “Title” in Eberhart, Fox, and
Allstate
The rulings in Eberhart and Fox are predicated on the theory
that non-assumption of title of a defective product insulates an entity
that would otherwise be considered a distributor, seller, or retailer
from strict liability.147 However, this is a misguided application of
the law.148 Any requirement for a retailer or distributor to hold title
in a defective product in order for it to be subject to strict liability is
absent from products liability statutes, from the Restatement and
from relevant case law.149
146

For a discussion of the future of e-commerce with respect to 5G technology,
see Nir Kshetri, 5G in E-Commerce Activities, IT PROF., July–Aug. 2018, at 73.
For a general discussion of the importance of e-commerce to the success of smalland medium-sized enterprises, see generally Qingyi Chen & Ning Zhang, Does
E-Commerce Provide a Sustained Competitive Advantage? An Investigation of
Survival and Sustainability in Growth-Oriented Enterprises, 7 SUSTAINABILITY
1411 (2015).
147
See Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 398 (S.D.N.Y.
2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *6
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018).
148
See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 498 (M.D. Pa.
2017) (noting specifically the distinction between the distribution method in
Oberdorf and the FBA service) (“Unless the third-party vendor participates in a
special ‘Fulfillment by Amazon’ program (which was not the case here), Amazon
has no interaction with the third-party vendor’s product at any time.”).
149
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8 (2018) (see supra note 106 for the
full text of the statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (2018) (see supra note
121 for the relevant text of the statute); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD.
LIAB., supra note 1; see also Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,
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The Eberhart court defended the title requirement on the
grounds that the “vast majority of opinions” in New York refer to
distributors only in the context of an entity who in-fact sold the
defective product.150 The problem with this defense is that simply
because there have only been opinions holding distributors who
have taken title to a defective product strictly liable, the definition
of distributor does not necessarily preclude entities that have not
taken title. In fact, the plain language of the Restatement and
precedent in other jurisdictions supports the assertion that
distributors do include entities that have not taken title.151
In Fox, Amazon argued that it was not a “seller” under Tenn.
Code Ann. § 29-28-102(7) because it never took title to the defective
hoverboard.152 The court did not necessarily find the lack of title
320–21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that “neither the transfer of title to the goods
nor a sale is required” for the application of the doctrine of strict liability);
Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 186–87 (N.J. 1982)
(“[Courts] have clearly rejected the requirement that a technical sale occur before
strict liability will be imposed.”) (citing Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental
Serv., 212 A.2d 769, 778–79 (N.J. 1965)); cf. Gray Line Co. v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 280 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding a tire company, which never
transferred title to the defective tire, liable to the plaintiff bus company for injuries
resulting from use of the tire); Greyhound Corp. v. Brown, 113 So.2d 916 (Ala.
1959) (holding a tire company, which never transferred title to the defective tire,
liable to the plaintiff bus company for injuries resulting from use of the tire);
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (holding a
lessor liable for injuries resulting from a defective product it leased to the
plaintiff’s employer); McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792
(Tex. 1967) (holding that a formal sale is not required to impose strict liability)
(“One who delivers an advertising sample to another with the expectation of
profiting therefrom through future sales is in the same position as one who sells
the product.”).
150
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 398–400 (citing McCormack v. Safety-Kleen
Systems, Inc., No. 110733/10, 2011 WL 1643590, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5,
2011) (holding that the defendant was not strictly liable because it was more
accurately classified as a common-carrier of the defective product than as a
distributor)).
151
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1; see also Barth,
71 Cal. Rptr. at 320 (“Neither the transfer of title to the goods nor a sale is
required” for the application of the doctrine of strict liability).
152
Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *7
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (2018)
(see supra note 121 for the relevant text of the statute).
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dispositive, but in conjunction with the court’s finding that Amazon
did not set the price of the hoverboard nor write the product
description displayed on the product page, the court declined to label
Amazon a “seller” for Tennessee PLA purposes.153 However, like in
Eberhart, the court cites no authority which requires assumption of
title for the imposition of strict liability.154 A close review of
statutory language and citations to the Tennessee PLA reveals no
authority that mentions a title requirement.155
In Allstate, the court dispensed with the notion that Amazon was
a “product seller” under the N.J. PLA because it never exercised
control over the defective product.156 It noted that title is a highly
significant factor in the determination of whether a seller exercised
control; though the factor is not dispositive, if an entity takes title of
a defective product, it is more likely that it exercised some control
over the product.157 The logic in the Allstate court’s opinion is
fallacious for the same reason that it is fallacious in Eberhart: taking
title may substantially inflate the likelihood that an entity exercised

153

Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *7; see also infra notes 194–96 and
accompanying text (discussing why Amazon did, at least to some extent, set the
price of the hoverboard).
154
See Fox, 2018 WL 2431628.
155
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102.
156
See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. This recent development
argues that Amazon actually did exert sufficient control over the defective product
in Allstate to be subject to strict liability under the N.J. PLA, given its extensive
physical and algorithmic control over the battery (even though the court’s
requirement that Amazon must have had control over the product to be subject to
strict liability was erroneous from the outset).
157
See, e.g., Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying
New Jersey law) (holding that an entity that actually took title to a truck before
selling it was a “seller” within the meaning of New Jersey products liability law);
Agurto v. Guhr, 887 A.2d 159, 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (“Strict
liability may also apply to a broker who takes possession of goods, or exercises
control over them, and then transfers them to a buyer.”). But see Laidlow v.
Hariton Mach. Co., 762 A.2d 311, 321 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (holding
that a broker who did take title to the defective product was not strictly liable for
injuries resulting from it).
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control, but it does not imply that a failure to take title exonerates an
entity from strict products liability.158
This outsized fixation on a requirement that an entity must have
held title to a defective product before it can be held liable for
injuries resulting from the product is improper given prior case law
which distinguishes title as merely one factor among many in
determining whether strict liability is appropriate.159 The most
appropriate legal conclusion, based on the facts, is that Amazon
should be held strictly liable for third-party products fulfilled
through its FBA service, given Amazon’s extensive and inextricable
role in directly facilitating the distribution of defective products.160
This problematic misinterpretation of the law behind strict products
liability is a troubling preamble to the judicial indifference toward
its policy underpinnings.
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The holdings in the four Amazon cases described in Part III
understate the importance of the larger policy goals of tort law and
mark a resistance to the natural evolution of tort law in tandem with
the evolution of a modernizing economy.161 The policy shift that
started with MacPherson and Escola was a response to the changing
158

See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 186–87 (N.J.
1982) (noting that New Jersey courts “have clearly rejected the requirement that
a technical sale occur before strict liability will be imposed”); see also Ketterer v.
Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) (“The remedies of injured
consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of the law of
sales.”).
159
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL
3546197, at *7 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (illustrating that, specifically, even though
it did not actually take title of the defective laptop battery, Amazon distributed,
packaged, labeled, marketed, and otherwise was involved in the placing of the
battery in the line of commerce); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-8(7) (2018) (see
supra note 106 for the full text of the statute).
161
For a discussion of the evolution of tort law as a response to a modernizing
economy, see generally Cornelius J. Peck, Negligence and Liability without Fault
in Tort Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 225, 240 (1971) (“[Strict liability] is a principle
with adaptability to serve the needs of society in a variety of situations.”); see also
John W. Wade, The Continuing Development of Strict Liability in Tort, 22 ARK.
L. REV. 233 (1968).
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economy of the twentieth century.162 Here, with Eberhart and its
predecessors, courts have failed to recognize the outsize role of ecommerce and online retail in the modern economy, as well as
Amazon’s specific role in placing potentially defective products into
the marketplace and thus into contact with consumers.
A. Incentivizing a Safer Marketplace for Consumers
One of the most common rationales given for strict products
liability is that it tends to promote product safety.163 The actual
efficacy of the strict products liability regime to incentivize product
safety is debatable, at best.164 There are some industries, such as
automobile manufacturing, where there is at least some correlation
between the imposition of a more stringent products liability regime
and increased safety in those products over time.165 Notwithstanding
the apparent lack of empirical evidence to support or refute strict
162

Peck, supra note 161, at 240 (“Problems of proof in suits against
manufacturers for harm done by defective products became more severe as the
composition and design of products and the techniques of manufacture became
less and less matters of common experience; this was certainly a factor bringing
about adoption of a strict liability standard.”).
163
See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (Wisc. 1979) (“Strict
liability is an effective deterrent; it deters the creation of unnecessary risks, or to
put it positively, strict liability is an incentive to safety.”); Harry Kalven, Jr., Tort
Watch, 34 J. AM. TRIAL L. ASS’N 1, 57 (1972) (“The first characteristic is thought
to make him a good target for the deterrence of the tort sanction. Liability is
imposed in the quest for safety and accident prevention . . . .”).
164
See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for
Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1436 (2010) (arguing that market forces and
government regulation are at least as likely to cause increasing product safety as
strict products liability). Compare George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981) (arguing that consumers are often
the most efficiently situated to insure against defective products), with William C.
Whitford, Comment on A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 91 YALE
L.J. 1371 (1982) (finding fault in the methodology of the former’s analysis).
165
W. Kip Viscusi, Does Product Liability Make Us Safer?, 35 REG., Spring
2012, at 24, 26–27 (showing that safety has increased significantly in automobile
manufacture since the ruling in MacPherson, but insurance costs remain relatively
high). But see Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 164. It is true that there are myriad
other variables that could affect increased safety in automobiles, such as
technological advances, government regulation, and increased consumer pressure
to produce safer vehicles. Nevertheless, products liability provides at least
symbolic, if not economic, incentive to increase product safety.
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products liability’s efficacy as a deterrent force, the incentivization
of a safer consumer marketplace is nonetheless one of the most
important justifications given in support of the regime as well as the
justification most closely aligned with the overarching deterrent
goal of tort law generally.166
To that end, Amazon is possibly better situated to efficiently
incentivize a safer internet marketplace than any other entity in the
modern e-commerce ecosystem. Amazon has already shown
promise in this area with its “ASBSA,” or “Amazon Services
Business Solutions Agreement.”167 The ASBSA currently provides
an encouraging framework for ensuring that third-party vendors can
be held accountable to Amazon’s shoppers. For instance, it already
requires that third party vendors indemnify Amazon in the event of
a suit resulting from one of the third-party vendors’ products.168 It
also requires third-party vendors to promise Amazon that they are a
duly and legally organized business and that all information
regarding the seller is true and accurate.169 Unfortunately, the reality
is that the ASBSA exists primarily to serve Amazon’s interest in
shielding itself from as much liability stemming from its third-party
vendors as possible.170 Not only that, but the ASBSA is only roughly
enforced to ensure that third-party vendors are legally reachable by
Amazon and its customers.171
Going forward, consumers would benefit along with Amazon if
it commits to effectively strengthening and enforcing its ASBSA
terms to ensure the reachability of its third-party vendors.
Additionally, Amazon possesses a great deal of leverage with which
it could exert more pressure on its third-party vendors to verify the
quality and legitimacy of the products they sell on Amazon. With
166

See generally Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV.
181 (2011); Jennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence,
52 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1993) (stating that a “central goal [of tort law] is to
reduce accident costs by deterring the creation of risks”).
167
Amazon
Services
Business
Solutions
Agreement,
AMAZON,
https://amzn.to/2FKJRcB (last visited Apr. 2, 2019).
168
Id. at ¶ 6.
169
Id. at ¶ 5.
170
Id. at ¶¶ 5–8.
171
See discussion infra Part V.D.1.
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any luck, Amazon’s influence would significantly hinder the sale of
dangerous counterfeit products such as the one that burned down the
Foxes’ home.172 Instead of placing profit above safety concerns,
Amazon should increase its oversight authority to ensure that thirdparty vendors comply with the ASBSA and any additional measures
necessary to ensure that they are held accountable in case of a
defective product.
B. Profit and Benefit: Social Responsibility
Justice Traynor emphasized the social importance of placing
losses from defective products with the parties responsible for
placing those products on the market.173 With the notable exception
of Oberdorf, Amazon played an intimate role in the overall
distribution of the defective FBA products in Part III.174 The
Restatement extends strict liability for defective products to all
“nonmanufacturing sellers or distributors” of those products.175 The
Restatement
specifically exempts
“product
distribution
facilitators” — those who “indirectly [facilitate] the commercial
distribution of products” — from strict liability.176 It cites advertising
firms, financing companies, auctioneers, and sales representatives
as examples of the type of “[indirect] distribution facilitators” that
are exempt from strict liability.177 However, Amazon is clearly
distinguishable from the type of entity that the Restatement exempts
as “[indirect] distribution facilitators,” and holding Amazon strictly
Counterfeit products are a relatively common — and dangerous —
occurrence on Amazon. See, e.g., Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief,
at 3–4, Apple, Inc., v. Mobile Star, LLC, 3:16–CV–06001 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17,
2016), 2016 WL 6110683 (alleging Mobile Star supplied counterfeit Apple
products for sale on Amazon) (“Consumers, relying on Amazon.com’s reputation,
have no reason to suspect the . . . products they purchased from Amazon.com are
anything but genuine.”).
173
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (“[If defective products enter the market] it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the
product, is responsible for its reaching the market.”).
174
See supra notes 49–75 and accompanying text.
175
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1, at cmt. e.
176
Id. § 20 cmt g.
177
Id. § 20 reporters’ n. g.
172
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liable more closely aligns with prior case law holding similar
nonmanufacturing retailers and distributors strictly liable.178
Before 1998, when the products liability Restatement was last
revised, Amazon had been a public company for less than a year and
sold only books.179 Its Amazon Prime service wasn’t launched until
2005, and its FBA service wasn’t launched until 2006.180 Amazon,
even today, defies traditional notions of what a “distributor” might
look like.181 However, Amazon plays an integral role in placing
potentially dangerous products into consumers’ hands, which is a
principal justification for imposing strict liability.182 The California
Court of Appeals in Kasel v. Remington Arms Co.183 explained this
178
See generally Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401,
408 (Ill. 1969) (holding a wholesaler liable for a defective hammer even though
the hammer merely passed unopened through the wholesaler’s warehouse); see
also Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (Ct. App. 1965) (holding
a wholesaler powder company strictly liable even though it never had possession
of the product and merely placed an order with the manufacturer, who shipped the
defective product directly to the customer); Little v. Maxim, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
875, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1970) (holding a distributor strictly liable even though it had
the defective product shipped directly to its customer and took no part in its
installation); Kirby v. Rouselle Corp., 108 Misc. 2d 291, 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1981) (holding that a distributor is strictly liable even though it never inspects,
controls, installs, or services the defective product).
179
BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF
AMAZON (Little Brown & Co., 2013) (noting that Amazon’s IPO was a “moderate
success”).
180
See id.; Press Release, Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon Launches New Services
to Help Small and Medium-Sized Businesses Enhance Their Customer Offerings
by Accessing Amazon’s Order Fulfillment, Customer Service, and Website
Functionality (Sept. 19, 2006) (https://press.aboutamazon.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/amazon-launches-new-services-help-small-andmedium-sized).
181
See supra notes 130–46 and accompanying text.
182
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal.
1963) (noting that liability attaches when a defective product is “placed on the
market”); see also Frank J. Cavico, Jr., The Strict Tort Liability of Retailers,
Wholesalers, and Distributors of Defective Products, 12 NOVA L. REV. 213, 221
(1987) (“Thus, although not responsible for the manufacture and production of
the product, retailers, wholesalers, and distributors occupy a position in, and
derive benefits from, the marketing chain, which is sufficient to impose strict tort
liability.”).
183
101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
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imposition by stating that “[i]t is the defendant’s participatory
connection, for his personal profit or other benefit, with the injuryproducing product and with the enterprise which created consumer
demand for and reliance upon the product which calls for imposition
of strict liability.”184 The “personal profit or other benefit” discussed
in Kasel is clear and straightforward when Amazon’s role in the
distribution of defective products is examined.
Amazon undoubtedly benefited economically and reputationally
from its role in placing defective products into the stream of
commerce, especially when those products were distributed through
the FBA service.185 It collects fees from third-party vendors to pay
for warehousing and order fulfillment.186 It benefits from increased
site traffic by having a wide-variety of products for sale on its site.187
It also obtains marketing benefits from the ability to extensively
brand merchandise it delivers with its own packaging and tape —
benefits that a newspaper would never enjoy from its classified ads
section.188 In addition to the physical marketing, Amazon also
benefits by digitally marketing itself through its open branding on
the product page and forthright acknowledgment of its role in
distributing the product.189 The “Prime” designation on products
184

Id. at 323.
See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
186
See id.
187
See id.
188
See id.
189
See, e.g., XPRIT Hoverboard w/Bluetooth Speaker (Black), AMAZON,
https://amzn.to/2IK1DRX (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). Any Amazon product page
for a FBA product will similarly show Amazon’s logo in the top left corner, as
well as a statement under the buy-box that says “Sold by [Seller] and Fulfilled by
Amazon.” Amazon specifically acknowledges part of its role in distribution by
explaining that “Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA) is a service we offer sellers that
lets them store their products in Amazon’s fulfillment centers, and we directly
pack, ship, and provide customer service for these products. Something we hope
you’ll especially enjoy: FBA items qualify for FREE Shipping and Amazon
Prime” (emphasis in original) (explanation available when the “Fulfilled by
Amazon” link is clicked). Id. This particular hoverboard also has an “Amazon’s
choice” label, which designates that a product is “highly rated, well-priced [and]
available to ship immediately” (explanation available when the “Amazon’s
Choice” label is clicked). Id. In the middle of the product page under the “Product
details” heading there is a sentence directing potential purchasers to a link for
185
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using the FBA service could also be seen as an implicit endorsement
of the quality of the items being sold, and reliance on Amazon’s
reputation is not unreasonable; in fact, Amazon is one of America’s
most trusted and beloved companies.190 Amazon further benefits
from the Prime designation economically by collecting fees from
Prime members, and its positive reputation grows from fulfilling
customer orders in a timely fashion.191

warranty information. Id. When that link is followed, a message from Amazon is
displayed that says, “Please contact the seller directly for warranty information
for this product. You may also be able to find warranty information on the
manufacturer’s
website.”
See
Amazon.com
message,
AMAZON,
https://amzn.to/1Pp0RGE (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). However, Amazon offers no
information regarding how to contact the seller or manufacturer. See id. In order
to contact the seller, XPRITINC, the purchaser must click the XPRIT name in the
“Sold by XPRIT, Fulfilled by Amazon” link. See id. Next, the purchaser must
navigate the XPRITINC storefront. See Amazon.com Seller Profile: XPRITINC,
AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2C1ufjZ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). From there, the
purchaser must click the “Ask a Question” button in the top right of the webpage.
See id. The communication is then handled through Amazon (“IMPORTANT
NOTICE: When you submit this form, Amazon will replace your email address
with one provided by Amazon in order to protect your identity, and forward the
message on your behalf. Amazon will retain copies of all e-mails sent and received
using this service, including the message you submit below, and may review these
messages as necessary to resolve disputes. By using this service, you consent to
this action. Amazon uses filtering technology to protect buyers and sellers and to
identify possible fraud. Messages that fail this filtering — even if they are not
fraudulent — will not be transmitted. This form is for use by Amazon customers
to ask product-related questions of sellers on our third-party platforms (Amazon
Marketplace and Merchants). The use of this form to send unrelated messages to
sellers is strictly prohibited.”). Id.
190
See Aaron Task, Americans Don’t Just Shop on Amazon, They Also Admire
and Trust It Too, FORTUNE (June 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/
2016/06/07/fortune-500-amazon-survey-monkey-poll/;
Karsten
Strauss,
America’s Most Reputable Companies, 2016: Amazon Tops the List, FORBES
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2016/03/29/
americas-most-reputable-companies-2016-amazon-tops-the-list/#5e54ea83712f.
191
See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
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C. Equitably Spreading Losses
Courts have often held that it is not the obligation of the retailer
to ensure that their products will not cause harm.192 A principal
justification for the imposition of strict products liability onto
retailers, however, is that retailers are often in control of the price of
a product, and therefore in a position well-suited to adjust prices in
order to compensate for potential liability.193 The courts in Allstate,
Fox, and Eberhart repeatedly pointed out that Amazon is not in
control of the price of products sold by third-party vendors.194
Although it is technically true that Amazon does not directly set the
price of these products, it exerts significant influence over prices by
collecting subscription fees, selling fees, per-item fees, and referral
fees, which are often computed as a percentage of the total purchase
price of a product, from its third-party vendors.195 Though a
traditional retailer might directly set the price of a product after
figuring his own markup, Amazon indirectly sets the price of thirdparty products by charging predictable fees that allow the third-party
vendors to set the overall product price after taking into account
Amazon’s share and the third-party’s desired markup.196 Therefore,
Amazon is as well-situated as a traditional retailer to adjust the
prices of its fees in order to compensate for potential liability. As a
result, the concerns expressed by the courts in Allstate, Fox, and
192

See, e.g., Syrie v. Knoll Int’l, 748 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Caldor
of Kingston, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 708 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
193
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964).
194
Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17–2738, 2018 WL 3546197, at
*8 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018); Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL
2431628, at *2, *8 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018).
195
See Selling on Amazon Fee Schedule, AMAZON, https://amzn.to/2UmlYBq
(last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (illustrating that these fees are in addition to the fees
incurred through FBA).
196
See id. Selling fees take into account certain shipping and packaging costs.
Id. Individual third-party vendors might pay a 99¢ per-item fee for each item sold.
Id. Professional sellers might pay a monthly subscription fee of $39.99. Id.
Referral fees are calculated as a percentage of the total purchase price of a product,
depending on the specific category a product falls into. Id. Most categories impose
a 15% referral fee, but the percentage can be as high as 45%. See id. Amazon
collects these fees from the purchase price paid by the consumer, and then remits
the excess to the third-party vendors. See id.
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Eberhart are misguided with respect to Amazon’s perceived lack of
control over product prices—if anything, Amazon exerts
considerable influence over product prices through its predictable
and consistent fee structures.
In any case, the imposition of the strict liability regime upon
retailers has given rise to products liability insurance for retailers,
which helps advance the policy goal of loss-spreading.197 It is
undoubtedly true that the procurement of general liability insurance
(which usually includes products liability insurance) greatly
increases the likelihood that a plaintiff will recover, especially
against a small business who may not have substantial assets.198 On
the other hand, one of the most salient arguments against this
suggestion that insurance is perhaps the most appropriate method to
allocate loss is that, especially for smaller businesses, products
liability insurance is hardly an option “for the product seller who,
not because of unacceptable business conduct, cannot procure
insurance or procure it at a cost which can be passed on to product
buyers in a way that will keep the cost of the product competitive.”199
These arguments are not persuasive when applied to Amazon.200
Amazon already charges Prime customers approximately $120 per
197

See Vandermark, 391 P.2d at 171–72 (Cal. 1964) (“[T]he retailer himself
may play a substantial part in insuring that the product is safe or may be in a
position to exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the retailer’s strict
liability thus serves as an added incentive to safety. Strict liability on the
manufacturer and retailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured
plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they can adjust the costs of
such protection between them in the course of their continuing business
relationship.” (emphasis added)); see also Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 230.
198
See generally Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J. OF
ECON. 120 (1982) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the two major
types of products liability insurance with respect to negligence-based products
liability as well as strict products liability).
199
See Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 231.
200
Contra Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL
3546197, at *12 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (“I find that stretching the case law to
capture Amazon’s activities in this case would conflict with the spirit of the law.
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has explained, courts should be cautious in
expanding the law when doing so ‘would impose a substantial economic burden
on these businesses and individuals, without necessarily achieving the goal of
enhanced product safety.’”); but see infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
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year for the service, and one of the main benefits of Prime
membership is faster access to products fulfilled through the FBA
or SFP services.201 Simply increasing the cost of Prime membership
by a nominal amount could cover some defective products liability
costs Amazon might incur through its roles in directly facilitating
the distribution of products into the stream of commerce.202
Additionally, part of the cost of insuring against products liability
could be borne (and is, perhaps, more appropriately borne) by the
third-party vendors themselves. In other words, Amazon could
increase its referral fees to pay for part of the increased costs of
liability insurance. This would also guarantee some degree of
indemnification, however indirect, from third-party vendors that are
unable or unavailable to be held accountable for injuries resulting
from defective products they sold through Amazon’s site.203
D. Revisiting Objections: Isn’t Negligence Enough?
Those who would oppose the imposition of strict products
liability to an entity with Amazon’s overall role in the marketing of
products might object on the grounds that gross negligence is a fair
standard by which to judge Amazon’s liability. After all, Amazon is
not clearly a distributor or retailer in all cases, and Amazon likely
did not cause the products in Part III to be defective. In
Congressional testimony, one witness stated:
[Strict products liability] has produced a . . . system which is badly out
of balance, and utterly lacking in equity and common sense. It no longer
fairly adjudicates claims based on responsibility. Rather it has become a
convenient mechanism to pay damages whenever someone is injured.
Unfortunately, the uncertainty created by this revolutionary change in
the law has produced a virtual “lottery” for businesses which sell
products.204

201

See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
For a discussion about the pricing of general business liability insurance with
respect to forecasting claim costs, see Scott E. Harrington & Patricia M. Danzon,
Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets, 67 J. BUS. 511 (1994).
203
See infra Part V.D.1 for a brief discussion of the lack of accountability on
the part of third-party vendors and manufacturers in these products liability cases
involving Amazon.
204
Problems Associated with Product Liability: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th
202
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However, the extension of strict liability to Amazon is necessary
because negligence has proven to be an inadequate standard by
which to promote the policy goals of products liability in general.
1. The “Unreachable” Problem
Without reachability, there is no way to hold the true seller or
manufacturer of a defective product liable for the injuries it might
cause.205 Especially with regards to products manufactured in China,
it can be particularly difficult for injured parties to seek recourse
under American law.206 It is fundamental to the promotion of
products liability’s policy objectives that an entity in the distribution
chain of a product be held accountable to injured plaintiffs. 207
Amazon remains unwilling to require enough of its third-party
vendors to ensure that they are reachable if a product proves
dangerous.
For instance, in Allstate, the third-party vendor of the defective
laptop battery, Lenoge Technology HK Ltd. (known as “E-Life” on
its Amazon seller account), is not subject to process in the United
States.208 Therefore, Ms. Wilmot was unable to sue Lenoge to
recover for the damage caused by its laptop battery, necessitating a

Cong. 353–54 (1979) (statement of William C. McCamant, Vice Chairman of the
Board, Nat’l Ass’n of Wholesaler-Distributors).
205
See Julia A. Phillips, Does “Made in China” Translate to “Watch Out” For
Consumers? The U.S. Congressional Response to Consumer Product Safety
Concerns, 27 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 217, 235 (2008).
206
See Meghan Josephine Carmody, The Price of Cheap Goods: International
Trade with China and the Need for Stringent Enforcement of Manufacturing
Regulations, 34 N.C. J. INT’L. L. 655, 660–86 (2009); see also Joel Slawotsky,
Liability for Defective Chinese Products Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 7
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 519, 541 nn.8, 18 (2008).
207
See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–41
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
208
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197,
at *4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (noting that, though Lenoge is not subject to process
in the United States, Lenoge did agree to indemnify Amazon for any damages
resulting from the sale of its products in the “Amazon Services Business Solutions
Agreement” it signed); cf. Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 229 (“The imposition of
strict tort liability upon non-manufacturers is based on the significant rationale
that retailers and wholesalers are entitled to indemnity from the manufacturer.”).
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suit against Amazon in order to recover.209 Similarly, in Fox, the
third-party vendor of the offending hoverboard, called “–DEALS–”
on its Amazon seller account (W2M Trading Corporation, in reality)
was unable to be contacted in the aftermath of the hoverboard
explosion.210 Amazon also does not allow contact between thirdparty sellers and buyers using FBA; communication regarding
customer support or other inquiries must be handled through
Amazon.211 Although the plaintiffs obtained default judgment
against W2M Trading Corporation for its failure to appear, W2M
itself was unlikely to pay for the plaintiffs’ injuries, which
necessitated the plaintiffs’ action to recover through Amazon
because the plaintiffs have been unable to contact W2M at all.212
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Oberdorf were “unable to identify or
locate a place of operations, contact information, or any agents” for
the third-party vendor from whom they purchased a defective dog
leash.213
In Vandermark, Justice Traynor expounded on the idea that
retailers should be held liable for injuries caused by defective
products they sell to their customers.214 “In some cases,” he wrote,
“the retailer may be the only member of [the overall producing and
marketing] enterprise reasonably available to the injured
plaintiff.”215 In FBA transactions where the third-party vendor is so
far removed from the consumer as to be unreachable, strict liability
should attach to Amazon as the member of the overall producing
209
For a fascinating discussion about Chinese manufacturers’ danger to the
public policy goals of the American strict products liability regime, see Stephen
Ray Strobel, Made Safely in the USA: Rethinking U.S. Strict Product Liability
Laws to Counter China, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 155 (2012).
210
First Amended Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 10–11, Fox v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2017), 2017 WL
728025.
211
See id.
212
Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *1
(M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also First Amended Complaint, supra note 210,
at 10–11.
213
Complaint at 3–4, Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-01127
(M.D. Pa. June 13, 2016), 2016 WL 3267591.
214
See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964).
215
Id.
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and marketing enterprise most reasonably available to the
consumer.216 In fact, the plaintiffs in Fox and Allstate assert that they
reasonably believed that they were purchasing the defective
products from Amazon itself.217 However inaccurate, this belief is
reasonable in light of Amazon’s inextricable role in distributing the
products.218
If Amazon wants the third-party vendors to be held responsible
for their defective products, it should require more of the third-party
vendors it allows to sell products using its FBA service.219 At a
minimum, Amazon should require them to provide information that
would allow them to be reached in the event a defective product
causes harm. Otherwise, according to Justice Traynor’s arguments
in Vandermark, Amazon should bear the cost of enabling its thirdparty vendors to remain unaccountable for injuries caused by their
defective products.220

216
See, e.g., Cavico, Jr., supra note 182, at 246 (discussing the potential liability
of resellers) (“A ‘passive’ reseller, acting as a mere conduit, should not be strictly
liable as a general rule. However, if a manufacturer cannot be effectively sued and
a judgment enforced, the reseller should be held to the liability status of the
manufacturer. Such secondary liability is necessary to minimize a plaintiff being
left without a liable and solvent defendant. This two-pronged principle of re-seller
liability evidences an awareness of traditional, utilitarian, and pragmatic tort goals
and does not offend one’s sense of fairness and justice.”).
217
Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL 3546197,
at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (“Ms. Wilmot . . . was under the impression that
Amazon was the battery seller.”); Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2 (“Both Mr. and
Mrs. Fox believed the hoverboard was purchased directly from Amazon.”).
218
See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. Such a belief is reasonable
because of the combination of (1) aggressive Amazon branding around the
product pages and on the shipping materials, (2) Amazon’s handling of the
financial transaction, and (3) Amazon’s handling of customer service (because the
traditional first point of contact for customers experiencing defective products is
to reach out to the brick-and-mortar retailer they purchased the product from). See
id.
219
See supra notes 197–203 and accompanying text for an alternative method
by which Amazon could guarantee some degree of indemnification from thirdparty vendors that are unreachable by injured plaintiffs.
220
See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171–72 (Cal. 1964).
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2. Negligent Misrepresentation
A sub-issue that has repeatedly been raised, especially in
Oberdorf, and to a lesser extent in Allstate and Eberhart, is that
Amazon should be held liable under a negligence theory for the
advertisements or product descriptions written by third-party
vendors and published on Amazon’s website.221 All three courts
found that Amazon could not be held liable for written content
published by third-party vendors, even if it was misleading or
incorrect, because it was immunized by the Communications
Decency Act.222 The text of the statute suggests this is the correct
result.223 However, the legislative history is less clear that the actual
policy intent behind the Act was to protect online retailers or
resellers from negligent content posted by third-parties that might
cause physical harm.224 Legislative action would likely be needed in
order to either once again restrict the scope of the Act to its original
intent, or to ameliorate the negative consequences of blanket
immunization in negligent misrepresentation products liability cases
by enacting a notice-and-takedown procedure similar to the one in
221
Eberhart v. Amazon.com, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 3d 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2018);
Allstate 2018 WL 3546197, at *12 n.9; Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F.
Supp.3d 496, 502–03 (M.D. Pa. 2017).
222
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400 n.5; Allstate, 2018 WL 3546197, at *12
n.9; Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 502–03; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017)
(“No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”).
223
Eberhart, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 400 n.5; see also Amazon.com, Inc.'s Reply to
Plaintiff’s Response to Amazon’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4–5, Fox v.
Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-03013 2018 WL 2431628 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 14,
2018), 2018 WL 3409587 (arguing Amazon should be immunized against
defective third-party vendors’ products) The court did not rule on that specific
defense, presumably because section 230 acts only to immunize against liability
resulting from written content, not liability resulting from defective products
themselves. See Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL
2431628, at *14 n.5 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018).
224
See, e.g., Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be
Earned and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 386 (2013) (“ . . . the
legislative history and text of section 230 suggests that the statute’s scope is
narrow — applying only to defamation claims and good faith efforts to selfregulate . . . .”).
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.225 The notice-and-takedown
procedure in a products liability context would require entities like
Amazon to issue a recall warning for potentially defective products
already sold and to remove third-party written content pertaining to
a particular product on their site upon notice that a particular product
is defective.226 As current law stands, negligent misrepresentation is
insufficient to protect consumers against potentially harmful thirdparty products sold on Amazon.
3. Negligent Failure to Warn
Injured plaintiffs might also pursue a negligent failure to warn
claim against Amazon for defective products purchased on its
website.227 In Fox, for instance, Amazon had ample notice of a
pattern of defective hoverboards sold on its site between the date
that Fox purchased the defective hoverboard on November 3, 2015,
the date that the hoverboard began to be used by the Foxes on
December 25, 2015, and the date of the catastrophic fire caused by
the hoverboard in question on January 9, 2016.228 Yet, despite
knowing that approximately 250,000 hoverboards were sold on
Amazon through December 10, 2015, and despite acknowledging
the possibility of additional potentially dangerous hoverboard
malfunctions after they were opened on December 25, 2015,
Amazon declined to recall the hoverboards.229 Instead, it merely sent
a “non-alarmist” email that failed to mention the specific safety

225
The notice-and-takedown procedure in a products liability context would
require entities like Amazon to remove products it knows to be harmful. See 17
U.S.C. § 512 (2017).
226
This would necessarily require Amazon to also suspend sales of the
defective product until the third-party vendor updates its content to include
sufficient warning.
227
For a discussion of the existing approaches to a post-sale duty to warn,
especially with respect to the doctrine’s potential burdens on manufacturers and
distributors, see generally Victor E. Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two
Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 892
(1983).
228
Fox v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 3:16–CV–03013, 2018 WL 2431628, at *2–
5 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 2018); see also supra notes 115–19 and accompanying
text.
229
Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *4.
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concerns that Amazon knew the hoverboards to have, such as their
significant fire-risk or risk of explosion.230
The court in Fox, however, dismissed the failure to warn claim
on the grounds that Tennessee courts do not recognize any post-sale
duty to warn.231 Even if Tennessee courts did recognize a post-sale
duty to warn, the Restatement attaches this duty only to sellers and
distributors.232 Because the court in Fox declined to recognize
Amazon as a seller or distributor under the Tennessee PLA, it seems
unlikely that it would reverse course and find that Amazon had a
duty to warn the Foxes about the potential dangers of the hoverboard
they purchased from its site.233 However, in jurisdictions where the
post-sale duty to warn is acknowledged, Amazon might be found
negligent if its substantial role in placing products onto the
consumer market is recognized. Therefore, in limited circumstances,
and if the appropriate factual conclusions regarding Amazon’s
distribution role are reached, this theory of negligence may be
sufficient to protect consumers. Yet, the current inability of
negligence theories to provide injured consumers with some degree
of recompense highlights the urgency with which the current strict
products liability regime must evolve.
E. Recognizing the Need for Evolution in Strict Products
Liability
It is impractical to assert that Amazon should be held strictly
liable for every potentially defective product sold on its site. The
number of products listed on its United States marketplace alone is
in excess of 500 million separate listings.234 Of course, it is more
230

See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text (noting Amazon was
specifically aware of seventeen separate fire or explosion incidents involving the
hoverboards in question).
231
Fox, 2018 WL 2431628, at *9–10 (citing, inter alia, Irion v. Sun Lighting,
Inc., No. M2002–00766–COAR3–CV, 2004 WL 746823, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2004)).
232
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB., supra note 1, at § 10.
233
See supra notes 159–60, 185–91 and accompanying text for an analysis of
why Amazon should be considered a seller or distributor given its FBA service.
234
How Many Products Does Amazon Sell? – January 2018, SCRAPEHERO
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.scrapehero.com/many-products-amazon-selljanuary-2018/. At the same time, this recent development is not suggesting that
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clear that Amazon is already strictly liable for defective products
sold under its own name, while it is not strictly liable for defective
products distributed by the FBM method, because its contact with
the product and overall responsibility for placing the product on the
market are minimal.235 Problematically though, Amazon is not
currently strictly liable for products sold through its FBA service,
and plaintiffs injured by these products have had little luck in
holding a responsible party accountable.236 The distribution chain
analysis currently employed by courts to impose strict liability no
longer makes sense in the modern economy, and tort law should
evolve to match changed circumstances.237
The essential purpose of the distribution chain analysis is to hold
strictly liable the entities that are most responsible for placing
defective products into the hands of consumers.238 It is apparent that
the mere quantity of product listings an entity maintains is any basis on which to
resist the due extension of strict liability. For instance, department stores and bigbox stores also offer large quantities of products for which they would be held
strictly liable for. The typical Walmart brick-and-mortar store, as an example,
carries around 120,000 products, and Walmart’s online store carries more than 35
million products. Matthew Boyle, Wal-Mart to Discount One Million Online
Items Picked Up in Stores, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-12/wal-mart-to-discount-1million-online-items-picked-up-in-stores (subscription required).
235
See Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496, 501 (M.D. Pa.
2017) (explaining that, here, Amazon’s minimal role in bringing the offending
dog leash to market is more comparable to a newspaper classified ads section;
therefore, it is not strictly liable for injuries caused by the dog leash).
236
See Allstate N.J. Ins. Co. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 17-2738, 2018 WL
3546197, at *4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2018) (“[T]he record does not reflect that [the
third-party vendor] was subject to process in [the United States].)”; see also Fox,
2018 WL2431628, at *1, *3 (noting the plaintiffs obtained default judgment
against the third-party vendor for failure to appear, and finding that Amazon did
not allow contact between the third-party vendor and the consumer before, during,
or after the hoverboard purchase); cf. Oberdorf, 295 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (stating
that although the third-party vendor did not utilize the FBA service, the plaintiff
was still unable to make contact with it after the defective product caused her
injury).
237
For a related discussion of why antitrust law should also evolve to match the
modern e-commerce economy dominated by Amazon, see generally Khan, supra
note 139.
238
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (“The
purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
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Amazon is more responsible for the overall marketing and
distribution of a product than a mere auctioneer, advertising agency,
or sales representative.239 Arguably, Amazon is as equally
responsible for the injection of the product into the stream of
commerce as the third-party vendor that posted it for sale through
Amazon and contracted with Amazon to fulfill it. Amazon is the
final entity to provide an advertising platform, collect payment on,
and handle a product before the carrier delivers it to the consumer
in an FBA transaction. It is also potentially the only accurately
named, reliably identifiable entity in the FBA sales process; thirdparty vendors are asked to use a “friendly” name as the display-name
on their Amazon seller account, which can conceal the true identity
of the seller.240 Moreover, Amazon is the most easily reached entity
in the process; for instance, in Fox, the third-party seller of the
hoverboard was impossible for the Foxes to contact in the wake of
their injuries, and the true manufacturer was impossible to
ascertain.241
For these reasons, it may be more loyal to the policy motivations
behind strict products liability to shift from a “distribution chain”
analysis to an inquiry more focused on determining the degree to
which any given entity is responsible for placing a defective product
on the consumer market.242 When this analysis is superimposed onto
the facts of Allstate, Fox, and Eberhart, Amazon is clearly meant to

defective products are borne by the [party] that put such products on the market
rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.”).
239
See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
240
See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text; see also Vandermark v.
Ford Motor Co., 391 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1964) (arguing that retailers should be
strictly liable for defective products because the retailer may be the most
“reasonably available” party in an enterprise). Here, where Amazon is often the
only member of the enterprise that is reasonably identifiable by name and/ or
location to the consumer, it follows that Amazon should be held strictly liable for
defective products sold on its marketplace.
241
See supra notes 109–22 and accompanying text.
242
See, e.g., Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285, 288 (D.N.J.
1986) (recognizing that courts should employ a “stream of commerce” analysis to
determine whether strict products liability is appropriate, rather than any physical
“touch” requirement).
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be held strictly liable for the injuries caused by defective products it
helped place on the market.
VI. CONCLUSION
The factual question that courts must grapple with is whether
Amazon’s Fulfillment by Amazon service is so inextricably tied in
with the direct facilitation of potentially defective products that it
should be held strictly liable for injuries resulting from them. To the
extent that Amazon’s role is comparable to the role of traditional
brick-and-mortar retailers in supplying potentially defective
products to the consumer market, Amazon should be held to a
comparable legal standard of accountability when consumers are
injured. However, Amazon continues to defy the traditional legal
understanding of what type of entities constitute distributors and
retailers. Nevertheless, the policy underpinnings of strict products
liability are still applicable in evaluating Amazon’s potential
responsibility to the consumer market at large.
The emerging trend of not holding Amazon strictly liable for
defective products sold on its website and fulfilled through its FBA
service raises substantial questions with respect to the overarching
policy goals of tort law, including deterrence, loss distribution,
corrective justice, and social responsibility. From a policy
perspective, the essential question is whether or not the current strict
products liability regime satisfactorily accomplishes those goals.
Courts reviewing these cases might consider refocusing their inquiry
on the original objectives of the American strict products liability
regime. In so doing, they would show a willingness to allow the
common law to naturally evolve in tandem with the modern
economy.243
243

See Roger J. Traynor, The Supreme Court’s Watch on the Law, in 2 HISTORY
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA 1900-1950, 207, 211 (J.
Edward Johnson ed., 1966) (“There are always some who note with alarm any
appellate opinion that goes beyond a mechanical canvass of more or less
established precedents. They include the diehards, dead set against all but familiar
routines. They include the slothful, who would rationalize their own inertia. They
also include carpers hostile toward any enlightenment, who would knowingly
impair judicial vigil by keeping the visibility low. Slyly they equate justice with
the blindfold image without articulating the corollary that decision would then be
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reduced to a blind toss of the coin. They do not state how problematic are the
problems that reach the Supreme Court, and how great the need for judicial
reasoning beyond formulas.”).
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